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Notes
Executive Foreign Affairs Power
and Immigration Relief
MITCHELL R. VANLANDINGHAM*
This Note addresses whether the president may take action on immigration as an
exercise of foreign affairs power. In particular, it focuses on DACA and DAPA, two
Obama-era policies of deferred action for certain classes of undocumented
immigrants. Exactly how much authority a president and his executive
departments should have over immigration without running afoul of Congress’s
Article I power “to create a uniform Rule of Naturalization” is still unsettled.
Furthermore, it is shaded in public debate by partisan views on immigration and
how much power a given party thinks its own president should have.
As immigrants still formally owe their allegiance to a foreign sovereign, might the
executive branch perform lenient or ameliorative actions over them via executive
foreign affairs power? Would that only add to the trend of creating a more
monarchical presidency? What would the boundaries of this power look like? This
Note posits that presidential foreign affairs authority, based on past practice,
supports the president’s power to offer limited forms of immigration relief, at least
in the absence of clear congressional prohibition, if the president judges that
denying such relief might have foreign affairs consequences.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2018; A.B. University of
California, Davis. The Author gratefully acknowledges the input of Professor Zachary Price and the
Hastings Law Journal Notes Committee, as well as the support of the Hastings Law Journal and Erica
Kalingking.
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INTRODUCTION
Undocumented immigration1 has become a polemical issue in
American politics. In 2012 and 2014 respectively, the Secretary of
Homeland Security announced two policies styled as prosecutorial
discretion: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)2 and

1. Undocumented immigrants arrive or remain in a given country without that country’s
authorization. Even though statutes, prior case law, and public discourse have used a number of terms
here (including “illegal aliens,” “illegal immigrants,” and “undocumented noncitizens”), I use the term
“undocumented immigrant” for this Note, when not quoting an authority that uses another term.
2. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO
INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-cameto-us-as-children.pdf [hereinafter DACA MEMORANDUM].
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Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”).3 These policies
allowed undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as
children, or the undocumented immigrant parents of citizens or lawful
permanent residents, to apply for a limited term, nonbinding assurance
from the federal government that removal proceedings would not be
initiated against them, provided they met certain conditions. The legal,
congressional, and academic challenges to DACA and DAPA framed the
issue as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion¾either as an abrogation of
rulemaking procedures or of the executive’s law enforcement duties.4
Are these the only ways to approach the issue? The executive has
plenary power over foreign affairs and interaction with foreign nations.5
Since undocumented immigrants are usually still the citizens of a
foreign sovereign, might the executive have power over immigration by
virtue of its foreign affairs power? If so, what are the ramifications of
this for the Trump administration, led by a president known for
hardline rhetoric against undocumented immigration?6
During the arguments on the stay of President Donald Trump’s
first “travel ban” executive order, at least one attorney for the federal
government alluded to a judicial inability to review executive actions on
immigration.7 This argument invoked the president’s plenary power
over foreign affairs. This reasoning raises the issue of whether the
president has plenary, unchecked power over immigration in every
situation. Assuredly, such absolute power would not square with the

3. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO
INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN AND WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE THE PARENTS OF U.S. CITIZENS OR PERMANENT RESIDENTS (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf
[hereinafter DAPA MEMORANDUM].
4. See infra Part II.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936);
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015).
6. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, Speech Accepting the Republican Party’s Nomination for
President (July 21, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/DJT_Acceptance_Speech.pdf (“We are
going to build a great border wall to stop illegal immigration, to stop the gangs and the violence, and
to stop the drugs from pouring into our communities.”).
7. See Brief for Appellants at 2, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.
17-35105), 2017 WL 511013 at *2 (“‘[T]he power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign
prerogative . . . .’ [The district court’s injunction] also contravenes the considered judgment of
Congress that the President should have the unreviewable authority to suspend the admission of
any class of aliens.” (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)) (emphasis added)). See
generally Exec. Order No. 13769 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (“Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”) (establishing the basis for the Washington v. Trump
litigation). In recent times, the Trump Administration has embraced the concept of executive action
unreviewability. See, e.g., Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast Feb. 12, 2017) (“[T]he powers of
the President to protect our country are very substantial and will not be questioned,” said
presidential senior advisor Stephen Miller).

VANLANDINGHAM -69.1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

356

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/22/17 12:44 AM

[Vol. 69:353

Constitution’s overarching theme of defining boundaries for federal
power.
This Note proposes that presidential foreign affairs authority,
based on past practice, supports the president’s power to offer limited
forms of immigration relief, at least in the absence of clear
congressional prohibition, if the president judges that denying such
relief might have foreign affairs consequences. This authority has been
discussed at length as a power inherent in sovereignty existing generally
in the federal government.8 This analysis fits with the president’s role as
the United States’ constitutional representative on the international
scene. Likewise, numerous administrations prior to that of President
Barack Obama took action on immigration on the president’s own
accord, with varying levels of input from Congress. Congress’s Article I
legislative power, however, forbids the president from using his power
to create substantive immigration laws absent congressional approval.
Examination of prior executive actions reveals that the president may
use his foreign affairs power to take ameliorative or lenient action on
immigration where it advances significant foreign affairs interests for
the United States, but not where such action would rise to the level of
being a substantive immigration law. This Note focuses on immigrantinclusive executive actions¾actions that operate to keep immigrants in
the United States¾rather than immigrant-exclusive actions, which
operate as a bar or restriction on entry.

I. IMMIGRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
The trajectory of the presidency has been to become more and
more powerful and imperial in nature.9 Moreover, American politics
has disintegrated into being as vituperatively partisan as ever.10
Accordingly, the rule of “the President must act as he sees fit regarding

8. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (2002) (discussing the historical origins and evolution of the doctrine of inherent powers over
foreign affairs).
9. See William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and
Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505 (2008).
10. This has manifested itself in a number of ways. This hyper-partisan political environment
has been framed as a danger to world peace (see, for example, Divisive Political Rhetoric a Danger
to the World, Amnesty Says, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-39048293); as affecting day-to-day economics (see, for example, Jonathan Bacon, How
Brands Are Responding to the Divisive Politics of 2016, MARKETING WK. (Dec. 2, 2016, 3:12 PM),
https://www.marketingweek.com/2016/12/02/brands-dragged-divisive-politics-2016/); and as
affecting interpersonal stability (see, for example, Jason Silverstein, Woman Claims Her Marriage
of 22 Years Ended over Husband’s Donald Trump Vote, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 7, 2017, 12:51 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/couple-22-years-divorcing-trump-vote-article1.2966332).
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foreign affairs” will no longer hold.11 The current seesaw in immigration
policy from administration to administration begs for the establishment
of boundaries regarding immigration law and policy, particularly since
the long-standing congressional gridlock on the issue12 means that the
electorate¾as it did in the 2016 election¾will look to the president as
the source of action on immigration. This occurred when the Obama
administration formulated DACA and DAPA, to the applause of the
political Left and the condemnation of the political Right.13 This again
occurred when President Trump signed his first “travel ban” executive
order in January 2017, to the applause of the Right and the
condemnation of the Left.14
A new way of conceptualizing the President’s immigration power is
necessary as long as: (1) immigration law remains an area where the
executive has considerable enforcement discretion; (2) Congress cannot
agree upon immigration reform; and (3) existing procedures across
administrations do little to improve the welfare of undocumented
immigrants. Furthermore, a foreign affairs theory of immigration
¾foreign affairs power being an area comprising considerable case law
and preexisting theory¾solves the issue of immigration law being so
unlike many other areas of law. The government cannot treat citizens
the way it treats immigrants, whether documented or not. For example,
upon commission or conviction of a relatively minor legal violation, a
citizen cannot be hauled before an administrative proceeding to be
removed to a country he has not seen in decades.15 The difference
between immigration law and other substantive areas of law is relatively
under-theorized. Finding a new solution that steers clear of value

11. Cf. Marshall, supra note 9, at 522 (“After all, one does not have to be an originalist to accept
the proposition that the Framers, having just gone through a revolutionary war to depose a monarch,
did not create a constitution that, in the name of national security or foreign affairs, would vest
unchecked power in the hands of a single individual.”).
12. See, e.g., David Nakamura, For More than 25 Years, It’s Never Been the Right Time for
Immigration Reform, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
for-more-than-25-years-its-never-been-the-right-time-for-immigration-reform/2014/02/15/
90a4ff08-93f9-11e3-84e1-27626c5ef5fb_story.html?utm_term=.0e405b48df3d.
13. In the United States since the late twentieth century, the Democratic Party has filled the role
of the mainstream left, and the Republican Party has filled the role of the mainstream right.
14. Compare Michael A. Memoli, House Passes GOP-Backed Bill Aimed at Obama’s ‘Imperial
Presidency’, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2014, 6:20 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
la-pn-house-imperial-presidency-bills-20140312-story.html (regarding the Obama administration),
with Carrie Napoleon, Protesters rally in opposition to immigration policy changes, CHI. TRIB.:
POST-TRIBUNE
(Feb.
4,
2017,
5:41
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/
post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-east-chicago-demonstrate-st-0205-20170204-story.html (regarding the
Trump Administration).
15. See, e.g., Kate Morrissey, Deportation of Grandmother Leaves a San Diego Military Family
Reeling, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/
la-me-grandmother-deportation-20170304-story.html (discussing the deportation of a woman who
was made an “enforcement priority” because of her lying on government paperwork ten years prior).
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judgments¾“criminals plotting terror attacks” and “huddled masses”
alike¾and instead looks at immigration law as being a constitutional
issue involving foreign affairs could wipe the muddled, punditry-laden
slate clean.
As of this writing, the number of undocumented immigrants living
in the United States is estimated at around 11 million.16 Undocumented
immigration poses unique issues for governmental and economic
systems. Although undocumented immigrants are formally removable,
there are far too many to find and deport in one stroke, especially given
that the Supreme Court has long held that undocumented immigrants
possess constitutional rights of due process17 and equal protection of the
laws.18 Furthermore, the deportation of undocumented immigrants
cannot be undertaken without foreseeing a considerable blow to
American business, where undocumented immigrants constitute
26 percent of the agricultural workforce and seventeen percent of the
cleaning and maintenance workforce.19
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to
“establish a[ ] uniform Rule of Naturalization.”20 Known as the
Naturalization Clause, the Supreme Court has interpreted this language,
when read parallel to the Necessary and Proper Clause, to give Congress
“considerable power over aliens” beyond solely naturalization.21
Congress has acted upon this power with considerable magnitude.
Federal laws governing immigration and naturalization are codified at
Title 8 of the United States Code.22 These laws cover the minutiae of the

16. See, e.g., BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGRATION
STATS., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES:
JANUARY 2012 (2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Unauthorized%20
Immigrant%20Population%20Estimates%20in%20the%20US%20January%202012_0.pdf
(estimating the number at 11.4 million); JEFFREY S. PASSEL ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., AS GROWTH STALLS,
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION BECOMES MORE SETTLED (2014), http://www.pew
hispanic.org/files/2014/09/2014-09-03_Unauthorized-Final.pdf (estimating the number at 11.3
million); Caitlin Dickerson & Jennifer Medina, California Farmers Backed Trump, but Now Fear
Losing Field Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/
us/california-farmers-backed-trump-but-now-fear-losing-field-workers.html (discussing the impact
that mass deportations would have on California’s agricultural economy).
17. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
18. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982).
19. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Share of Unauthorized Immigrant Workers in Production,
Construction Jobs Falls Since 2007, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.pewhispanic.org/
2015/03/26/share-of-unauthorized-immigrant-workers-in-production-construction-jobs-falls-since
-2007/.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
21. Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 418 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d,
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18 (“[Congress shall have power to] make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . .”).
22. For illustrative provisions codified in Title 8, see infra notes 23–26.
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immigrant experience in the United States, from immigration,23 to
naturalization and removal,24 to refugee assistance,25 to restriction of
public benefits.26
However, as a matter of course, Congress cannot enforce the
immigration laws it makes. That duty must be left to the president,
acting largely through the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).
The Constitution vests all executive power in the president,27 stating
that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”28 The Take Care Clause acts as a congressional check on the
president, prohibiting him from suspending laws he finds objectionable
or inapposite to his policy goals.29 A certain amount of enforcement or
“prosecutorial” discretion is necessary nonetheless, for three reasons.
The first is a holistic type of fairness. To-the-letter enforcement of
federal law¾or any law¾regardless of a person’s good-faith mistake or
other lack of a culpable activity does little to further the ends of justice.
The second reason is efficiency. The sheer volume of federal laws and
regulations that a comparatively small federal government is tasked
with enforcing means that rigorous enforcement of federal law would
place too great of a strain on the system.30 Third, the president has the
independent power to judge a law’s constitutionality, and may decline
enforcement on constitutional grounds.31
The first two factors were at play when, in 2012, under the
direction of the Obama Administration, DHS announced DACA, a
policy of prosecutorial discretion for undocumented immigrants who
came to the United States as children. Fairness was a major
consideration behind DACA, as it applied to “certain young people who
were brought to this country as children[,] . . . know only this country as
home . . . [, and] lack[ ] the intent to violate the law . . . .”32
23. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1381 (2012).
24. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421–1459 (2012).
25. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521–1524 (2012).
26. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1646 (2012).
27. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”).
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This provision is commonly called the Take Care Clause.
29. For a detailed analysis of the Take Care Clause and its interplay with enforcement
discretion, see Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV.
671, 690 (2014).
30. See id. at 676.
31. This theory, called “departmentalism,” holds that each branch of the government is an
adequate judge of the constitutionality of its own acts and those of the other branches. The tenth
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary characterizes it as “prominent in the decades shortly after
ratification,” but mostly giving way to judicial supremacy afterward. Departmentalism, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). But see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013)
(regarding the executive’s declining to defend the Defense of Marriage Act in the Windsor litigation,
which might be viewed as a modern articulation of departmentalism).
32. DACA MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at 1.
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Furthermore, DACA attempted to incorporate administrative efficiency
considerations, to ensure that “enforcement resources are not expended
on these low priority cases but are instead appropriately focused on
people who meet our enforcement priorities.”33 Procedurally, DACA
offered a non-binding, two-year, renewable guarantee that removal
proceedings would not be initiated against applicants who met the
following criteria:
1. Arrival in the United States under the age of sixteen;
2. Residence in the United States for at least five years prior to 2012
and at the time the policy was initiated;
3. Education or military service requirements;
4. No felony or significant misdemeanor convictions;
5. Under the age of thirty; and
6. Successful completion of a background check.34

Two years later, the DHS expanded DACA to remove the age cap
and initiated a similar policy for people who are undocumented
immigrants but have citizen or lawful permanent resident children,
subject to similar conditions as DACA.35 This expanded program was
known as DAPA.

II. OBJECTIONS TO DACA AND DAPA
Both DACA and DAPA have seen a number of challenges in
Congress and in the judiciary. Among the most vehement objections to
DACA and DAPA arose from both houses of Congress. 2014 marked the
first election in eight years in which the Republican Party gained a
majority of both the Senate and House of Representatives, creating a
forceful opposition against the Democratic Party that controlled the
White House.36 As a result, a vigorous dispute ensued in the legislative
branch about the constitutionality of the deferred action policies. This
was in addition to the litigation that the policies had already generated
in the judicial branch.
On June 15, 2017, President Trump’s then-Secretary of Homeland
Security, John F. Kelly, issued a formal rescission of DAPA, thereby
mooting the qualms related to that policy.37 This action specifically left

33. Id.
34. For all of these elements, see id.
35. DAPA MEMORANDUM, supra note 3.
36. Compare FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2014: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. SENATE
& THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2015), with FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2006:
ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. SENATE & THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2007).
37. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RESCISSION OF NOVEMBER 20, 2014 MEMORANDUM PROVIDING FOR
DEFERRED ACTION FOR PARENTS OF AMERICANS AND LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS (“DAPA”) (2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf
[hereinafter DAPA RESCISSION MEMORANDUM].
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in place DACA.38 This came as a shock to many, since President Trump
had stated that he would rescind DACA while on the campaign trail in
2015 and 2016.39 A rescission of DACA came not long after, on
September 5, 2017.40 The DHS’s memorandum rescinding DACA¾after
fleetingly casting doubts on the policy’s constitutionality41¾indicated
that deferred action status would not be terminated immediately, but
would be adjudicated afterward on a case-by-case basis where still
applicable.42 Given that this launched litigation not only by individual
DACA beneficiaries, but also by sixteen state attorneys-general, the
fight over DACA’s constitutionality seems likely to persist for some time
after the ink was spilled rescinding the program.43
A. CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO DEFERRED
ACTION POLICIES
Congressional hearings shortly after the 2014 election cycle
contested the constitutionality of the policies. In the House Judiciary
Committee’s hearing on DACA and DAPA, Congressman Bob Goodlatte,
a Virginia Republican and the chair of the committee, derided the
policies as a usurpation of Congress’s legislative authority and an
abdication of the president’s law enforcement duty.44 Characterizing
DACA and DAPA as “one of the biggest constitutional power grabs ever
by a President,” Congressman Goodlatte viewed the policies as allowing
undocumented immigrants a plethora of benefits, including work
authorization, social security, and tax benefits.45 One of the hearing’s

38. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rescission of Memorandum Providing for Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) (June 15, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providing-deferred-actionparents-americans-and-lawful (“The June 15, 2012 memorandum that created the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program will remain in effect.”).
39. See, e.g., Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 16, 2015) (“The executive order
gets rescinded . . . . We have to make a whole new set of standards,” said President Trump regarding
the Obama-era immigration actions, including DACA.).
40. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM ON RESCISSION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR
CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (“DACA”) (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/
memorandum-rescission-daca.
41. The day before DACA’s rescission, the U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions sent a letter to the
DHS indicating his opinion that “DACA was effectuated by the previous administration through . . .
an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws [and] was an unconstitutional exercise of
authority by the Executive Branch.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
42. Id.
43. See Second Amended Complaint at *34–35, Vidal v. Duke, No. 1:16-cv-04756 (NCG) (JO)
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017) (challenging DACA’s rescission, filed by DACA recipients); Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at *55, New York v. Trump, No. 17-cv-5228 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2017).
44. Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration: H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1–3 (2015) (opening statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary) [hereinafter House Deferred Action Hearing].
45. Id. at 1.
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witnesses, Nevada Attorney General Adam Paul Laxalt, advanced a legal
argument against deferred action, namely that the policies violated the
Take Care Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).46
Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, a California Democrat, raised a political
defense and argued that DACA and DAPA function as a means of
effecting change on immigration policy in view of partisan-motivated
government shutdowns and obstructionism.47
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearing, pressingly (if
melodramatically) entitled Declining Deportations and Increasing
Criminal Alien Releases¾The Lawless Immigration Policies of the
Obama Administration, featured testimony from a number of
immigration experts and political theorists. One such witness, Mark
Krikorian of the conservative-leaning Center for Immigration Studies,
stated that the deferred action policies were not “true” prosecutorial
discretion, which he defined as actions by “individual law enforcement
officers in ways that do not undermine the agency’s mission.”48 Rather,
Krikorian described the deferred action policies as being a “pretext for
exempting the vast majority of immigration violators from any
possibility of legal consequences.”49
The judiciary has been no friend to the deferred action policies,
despite not tackling the issue head-on. One case in the federal appeals
court for the D.C. Circuit, Arpaio v. Obama, rejected a claim against the
policies due to lack of the plaintiffs’ standing,50 despite one concurring
judge calling the policies “problematic.”51 The Fifth Circuit, in Texas v.
United States, affirmed a preliminary injunction that halted the
implementation of DAPA.52 An evenly divided Supreme Court, in the
wake of Justice Antonin Scalia’s death, affirmed the Fifth Circuit in a
one-line per curiam opinion.53 Although the underlying claims in Texas
v. United States were that DAPA violated rulemaking procedures and
abrogated the President’s law execution duty, the Fifth Circuit did not
address the merits of the claims.54

46. Id. at 11.
47. Id. (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Immigration and Border Security).
48. Declining Deportations and Increasing Criminal Alien Releases¾The Lawless
Immigration Policies of the Obama Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and the Nat’l Interest of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (statement of Mark
Krikorian, Exec. Dir. of the Ctr. for Immigration Studies) [hereinafter Senate Deferred Action
Hearing].
49. Id.
50. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
51. Id. (Brown, J., concurring).
52. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 150 (5th Cir. 2015).
53. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). It is worth noting, however, that the
Supreme Court’s affirmance cannot be viewed as establishing any kind of binding precedent.
54. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 146.
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THE MISSING FOREIGN AFFAIRS PUZZLE PIECE

Two notable themes in the above challenges to the deferred action
policies exist. One is that DACA and DAPA violate the rulemaking
procedures and requirements under the APA.55 The APA sets forth
notice and public comment requirements before a federal agency can
make a new rule.56 It also allows a court to set aside agency rules that
exceed the agency’s statutory authority, or if the rules are
unconstitutional.57 Opponents of the policies argue that since DACA
and DAPA are the “rules” of an administrative agency (here, DHS), and
because they did not go through the APA-mandated processes, they
must be set aside. The opaque nature of agency rulemaking doctrine
tends to confuse the constitutional issue around these policies.
Moreover, at least one set of scholars believes a challenge to DACA and
DAPA on rulemaking grounds would not likely prevail.58 Therefore, this
Note assumes arguendo that there is no rulemaking issue with these
policies.
The other theme is that the policies are flatly unconstitutional,
owing to Congress’s Article I authority and the president’s Take Care
Clause duty. However, many of these objections are based upon a
traditional understanding of constitutional jurisprudence, under the
assumption that immigration law is treated the same from a
constitutional point of view as, for example, criminal law and civil
actions. A principle of “immigration exceptionalism”¾that is, a
departure from “mainstream constitutional norms”59¾marks American
immigration jurisprudence. A large part of this theory derives from the
plenary power doctrine in immigration case law, which states that the
federal government has plenary power over immigrants as an essential
attribute of sovereignty.60
This plenary power is aligned with and derives from the plenary
power over foreign affairs that the federal government has¾specifically,
the president¾as discussed in Part III.B. Truly, this exercise of power is
exceptional, resulting in “a regulatory regime that . . . ‘would be

55. The DHS, which formally propagated the policies, is considered an “agency” under the APA.
See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012).
56. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
57. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
58. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 216 n.313 (2015) (doubting that a court could consider DACA and DAPA as
“legislative rules”).
59. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U.
L. REV. 583, 584 (2017).
60. See id. at 596; accord Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)) (recognizing that power to exclude immigrants is a “fundamental
sovereign attribute”).
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unacceptable if applied to citizens.’”61 Ordinarily, mainstream
constitutional theory as it applies to citizens does not quite work when
considering immigration law, and so much of the jurisprudence
surrounding the federal government’s interaction with immigrants is
rooted in its power to conduct international affairs. It follows that
immigration law and foreign affairs power should be discussed in
tandem.

III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
Article II of the U.S. Constitution alludes to indicia of the
president’s foreign affairs power.62 Some of these powers are vested in
the president alone, such as the power to be “Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States,”63 and the power to “receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”64 Other foreign affairs
powers occur only with Senate agreement, such as the power to appoint
ambassadors “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” and
the power to make treaties “provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”65 This is the extent of where the Constitution speaks on
executive power over foreign affairs.
A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXECUTIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
It would be misleading to state that the federal government only
possesses foreign affairs power through constitutional fiat. The federal
government has power over foreign affairs simply by virtue of its status
as a sovereign nation.66 Since the states cannot, for example, enter into
agreements themselves with foreign nations, it follows that the states
lack this foreign affairs power.67 According to Professor Sarah H.
Cleveland, foreign affairs power is not “derived from, nor substantially
limited by, the Constitution” and is largely insulated from judicial
review because it is a power inherent in sovereignty.68
Building on this “inherence” theory, immigration is part of this
foreign affairs power. The immigration of foreigners to the United

61. Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 59, at 596 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 80 (1967)).
62. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3.
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
66. See Cleveland, supra note 8, at 7; cf. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 542 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so
stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign
affairs of the nation.”).
67. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation.”).
68. Cleveland, supra note 8, at 8.
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States was very much on the minds of the Framers. Indeed, one of the
grievances that the founding generation had against Great Britain
before the Revolution was that “the King had obstructed free
immigration to the colonies,” and furthermore, “at the time of the
framing, the United States generally encouraged free immigration,
while various states maintained laws authorizing the expulsion of aliens
deemed undesirable.”69 Notably, the Constitution’s Naturalization
Clause took this power away from the states, and most courts today look
with disfavor on allowing the states to remove immigrants themselves.70
Moreover, as the United States’ federal system matured throughout the
nineteenth century, numerous scholars of that era found a nation’s right
to control who may enter its borders to be a foundational principle of
international law, without weighing the Constitution into the calculus.71
It would be inadvisable to use the “inherence” analysis to
supersede the constitutional text entirely. The rule of law in the United
States¾in its most general terms¾requires governmental acts to flow
from constitutional authority and to be subject to judicial review, within
reason.72 However, the “inherence” principle provides cohesion for the
Constitution’s piecemeal approach to executive foreign affairs powers.
Led by the “inherence” theory, a major constitutional principle becomes
apparent: the Naturalization Clause operates not so much to make
immigration and naturalization the exclusive province of Congress, but
rather to make them the exclusive province of the federal government.
This is a reaction to the pre-Framing removal authority that the states
understood themselves to possess.73 It should not be interpreted as

69. Id. at 81. For a prime example of the founding generation’s immigration grievance against
Great Britain, see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776): “He [i.e., King George III of
Great Britain] has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that Purpose
obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; [and] refusing to pass others to encourage
their Migrations hither.”
70. Recently, courts have applied this rule to strike down state and local laws against
undocumented immigrants on the grounds that those laws act as a usurpation of the federal
authority on immigration. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013); Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013). Contra Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013)
(holding anomalously that a city ordinance forbidding undocumented immigrants from holding
rental occupancy licenses was not an impermissible regulation of immigration, the direct opposite of
the Villas at Parkside Partners holding above).
71. See Cleveland, supra note 8, at 85–86.
72. I say “within reason” purposefully here, as some acts cannot be open to judicial review, such
as those that are considered chiefly political questions. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
73. See Cleveland, supra note 8, at 81. The records of the 1787 Constitutional Convention
likewise indicate a desire to take naturalization power away from the states and place it in the hands
of the federal government. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 245 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) (“Res[olve]d. the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every State”).
Indeed, the federal supremacy of varied aspects of immigration law, and not just the naturalization
mentioned in the Naturalization Clause, figured quite early in United States immigration
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shearing the president of all authority to act on immigration by himself,
rather than acting as Congress’s loyal factotum, as many commentators
have alluded he should.74
B.

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXECUTIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

Support for the executive’s possession of plenary power over
foreign affairs arises both in writings near in time to the Framing as
well as in later case law interpreting the Constitution. The
Constitution’s approach to foreign affairs power is markedly different
from that of the Articles of Confederation, which required the consent
of “the United States in Congress assembled” in order to conduct
diplomatic acts.75 Almost half a century after the Constitution’s drafting,
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story argued in favor of the
Constitution’s pivot away from the Articles of Confederation’s approach
to foreign affairs. To Justice Story, certain diplomatic functions, such as
receiving ambassadors in particular, must be left to the executive
alone.76 Accordingly, the Constitution’s delegation of these powers to
the executive accounted for three considerations: first, that foreign
governments had vested this power in their executive as well; second,
that it would be too onerous to keep the Senate (for example) in
constant session to allow for potential international emergencies if the
Senate were to exercise that power; and third, that the President was
unlikely to abuse the power.77
In constitutional jurisprudence on foreign affairs power, a leading
decision (and incidentally one which largely bolsters the “inherence”
theory) is the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. Curtiss-Wright¾an aircraft manufacturer
and defense contractor¾was charged with selling arms and munitions
to the South American belligerents in the Chaco War, in violation of a

jurisprudence. See generally The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (striking down state
laws that levied a per-head tax on foreign nationals arriving in the states’ ports).
74. For a representative example of this view, see Guillermo I. Martinez, True Immigration
Reform Should Not Be Done by Executive Order, SUN-SENTINEL (July 29, 2015), http://
www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/fl-gmcol-oped0730-20150729-column.html.
75. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, para. 1 (“No State, without the consent of the
united States, in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or
enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or State.”).
76. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
§§ 1565–1569 (2d ed. 1851).
77. See id. § 1561. It is worth remembering that Justice Story was writing in the midst of the
golden age of imperialism, when the United States maintained diplomatic relations with a small
fraction of the nations that it currently does. This was largely because the vast empires of the United
Kingdom, Spain, the Ottomans, and France, as well as the lack of connections to many Asian and
African countries, made the possibility foreign relations with hundreds of competing nations a
nullity. His assertion that reception of ambassadors had a low potential for abuse might seem quaint
in view of twenty-first century international relations.
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congressional resolution and presidential proclamation.78 The issue in
the case was whether Congress had improperly delegated to the
president the power to prevent the arms sales.79 The Court held that
there was no such improper delegation, because “[t]he President is the
constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign
nations.”80 This is so because, since before the Revolution, the
individual states never had international relations powers: The power of
“external sovereignty” passed from the British Crown to the new United
States government, first to the Continental Congress,81 and eventually
to the executive once the Constitution created that office.82 Applying the
“inherence” principle, the Court stated:
[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power [is held by] the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations¾a power which does not require as a basis for
its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the Constitution.83

This holding strikingly contemplates constitutional boundaries to
the powers. The essential principle here is that the president has the
power to conduct foreign affairs, and those powers are plenary. In other
words, the president’s foreign affairs powers are wide-ranging,
requiring no delegation from Congress and minimal oversight from that
body.
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court explicitly upheld executive
action on immigration as an indicium of the sovereign’s foreign affairs
power in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.84 Knauff
pertained to a German national who was denied entry into the United
States upon confidential evidence and without a hearing,
notwithstanding her marriage to a U.S. citizen.85 Justice Minton wrote
for a four-person majority, with two justices recused and three
dissenting. Citing to Curtiss-Wright, inter alia, as authority, the Court
stated:

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311 (1936).
See id. at 314–15.
Id. at 319 (quoting U.S. Senate, Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, p. 24).
Id. at 316–17.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 320.
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
See id. at 539–40.
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[T]here is no question of inappropriate delegation of legislative power
involved here. The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of
sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power
but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of
the nation . . . . When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the
admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power.
It is implementing an inherent executive power.86

The foreign national wife was thus barred from entering the United
States.87 Knauff signals the acceptance of the plenary power doctrine as
it pertains to immigration.88
C.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER

One problem with applying the plenary power theory to executive
actions on immigration is particularly glaring. Congress has Article I
power over immigration through the Naturalization Clause.89 The
distribution of power here must, in some form, respect Congress’s
legislative authority over immigration. Although the Naturalization
Clause firmly plants the power over immigration and naturalization in
the realm of the federal government, the constitutional text is
insurmountable: the power is conferred upon Congress, not the
president. The constitutional text, as interpreted over time by courts,
gives Congress the power to create substantive immigration laws, the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its various amendments
being exemplary.90 Notably, the INA respects the president’s plenary
power, especially at sections 212(f),91 214(a)(1),92 and 215(a)(1),93 where

86. Id. at 542; see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).
87. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 547.
88. See, e.g., Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 443 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Thus,
Knauff and Mezei essentially restored the political branches’ plenary power over aliens at the border
seeking admission. And since these decisions, the Court has continued to signal its commitment to
the full breadth of the plenary power doctrine, at least as to aliens at the border seeking admission to
the country.”).
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
90. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as first enacted in 1952 overhauled the United
States legislative schema on immigration, while still keeping in place various restrictive elements like
nationality quotas and prohibitions against people with certain political views. See generally INA of
1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). Subsequent amendments to the INA of 1952 loosened
several of the original restrictions, although United States immigration law still retains many
vestiges of the old systems. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler Act),
Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (abolishing the quota system based on national origin);
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (providing for family-based
immigration visas and the Diversity Immigrant Visa program, as well as the Temporary Protected
Status visa for immigrants from countries experiencing armed or environmental upheaval). But see
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (allowing, inter alia, immigrants who had committed minor criminal
offenses to be eligible for deportation).
91. See infra Part V.A.
92. INA § 214(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1) (2012)) (allowing admission of
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it treats the presidential authority as being one of regulation and
discretion.
On the other hand, the president himself does have substantive
foreign affairs power. The Supreme Court recognized this in Dames &
Moore v. Regan, which contemplated whether an executive order’s
suspension of all claims against Iran brought before a claims tribunal
¾a reaction to the 1979 Iran hostage crisis¾was a constitutional
invocation of executive power.94 In light of “the character of the
legislation Congress has enacted in the area” and “the history of
[congressional] acquiescence in executive claims settlement,” the Court
held that it was constitutional.95 This holding was based in part on
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, where the validity of the president’s
action, when the president and Congress have concurrent authority,
must be viewed in light of “congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence.”96 Accordingly, an evaluation of the whole character of the
President’s actions regarding foreign affairs¾and Congress’s
interaction with the subject¾is in order to determine the
constitutionality of the President’s actions in that sphere.
In sum, the president has no power to create substantive
immigration laws by himself and of his own prerogative. There is,
however, a foreign affairs nexus that allows for a measure of
independent presidential authority: immigrants remain citizens or
subjects of a foreign sovereign until naturalized, therefore “[a]n
Englishman who removes to France, or to China, owes the same
allegiance to the king of England there as at home, and twenty years
hence as well as now.”97 Just as the Supreme Court concluded in Dames
& Moore regarding presidential authority to act on foreign affairs
matters independently, finding the president’s independent authority
on immigrant-inclusive actions as an exercise of foreign affairs power
requires examining the existing legislative scheme and the history of
Congress’s action, inaction, or acquiescence in similar matters.98 In
terms of the preexisting legislative scheme, the provisions of the INA

nonimmigrant aliens “for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by
regulations prescribe”).
93. Id. § 215(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (2012)) (“Unless otherwise ordered by the
President, it shall be unlawful¾(a) for any alien to depart from or enter . . . the United States except
under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions
as the President may prescribe.”).
94. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660–62 (1981).
95. Id. at 686.
96. Id. at 668–69 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
97. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *357–58 (1765).
98. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686.
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cited above afford the president considerable discretion in many actions
on immigration.99 An examination of prior executive actions on
immigration¾and congressional interaction with them¾proves helpful
in determining the shape of this presidential authority and the
situations in which it may be exercised.
IV. CONTEMPLATING PRIOR EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION
Presidents generally abide by the traditions of their predecessors,
and breaks from those traditions are significant when they occur.
However, there is no formal presidential equivalent of stare decisis.
Presidents are not legally bound by the actions of prior presidents in the
same way that judges are by prior opinions.100 In this way, referring to
past presidents’ actions on immigration to support the reasoning in the
sections above are all varieties of the “appeal to tradition” fallacy.
However, the brevity of Article II, coupled with the current
complexities of the executive branch, mean that a number of executive
functions are necessarily established by tradition or other
extra-constitutional authorities that have the force of law. Most
noteworthy, the power to issue executive orders has no explicit
constitutional foundation. Likewise, the specific procedures of
senatorial advice and consent are without express constitutional basis,
other than a general provision allowing the congressional bodies to
“determine the Rules of [their] Proceedings.”101 The point here is that
while presidents might not necessarily be legally bound by the actions
of their predecessors, time, tradition, and procedural rules create a
quasi-legal precedent by which presidents should abide.102
Accordingly, evaluating prior executive actions on immigration can
be useful in determining how past presidents have implicitly invoked a
foreign affairs rationale in taking those actions. The following analysis
will focus on executive actions that kept foreign nationals in the
country, rather than excluding them. These situations will be the most
99. Especially of note here is the provision allowing “admission to the United States of
[nonimmigrant] alien[s] . . . for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General
may . . . prescribe . . . .” INA § 214(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1)).
100. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 58, at 114 (declining to treat actions by other
administrations as “quasi-legal precedent”).
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Rule XXXI of the Standing Rules of the United States Senate, for
example, governs how confirmation hearings are to be conducted in a manner that provides the
Senate’s advice and consent for presidential nominees. See U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN.,
U.S. SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 113-1, Rule XXXI, at 58–59 (2014). It is important to note that the
rules in the Senate Manual are parliamentary procedures, not laws, and thus do not go through the
usual bicameralism and presentment procedures prescribed for laws by Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution.
102. William P. Marshall also contemplates that previous presidents’ usage of power created
room for subsequent presidents’ usage of that same power, allowing for an inevitable “one-way
ratchet” in increasing the presidency’s power. Marshall, supra note 9, at 511.
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help in determining the permissibility of policies such as DACA and
DAPA. Three twentieth century examples most pointedly implicate
executive foreign affairs powers being exercised in an immigrantinclusive context, and take place over both Democratic and Republican
administrations and Congresses: the bracero program, which started in
the 1940s, slightly over 900 “foreign-born orphans” adopted by U.S.
citizen parents in 1956, and the program for Chinese students
implicated in the Tiananmen Square protests in the 1980s.
A. THE BRACERO PROGRAM
The bracero program operated in the United States from 1942 to
1964103 and was initiated through a bilateral international agreement.
This invoked the executive’s foreign affairs power, and wavered in
Congressional support throughout the program’s lifetime. It is
substantially different from the other examples below in that it was not
solely a reaction to a specific event of limited duration. The genesis of
the bracero program was a shortage of farm labor as a result of World
War II,104 but the entire program lasted for a generation beyond that.
The program allowed contract farm laborers to come to the United
States from Mexico, initially guaranteeing them thirty cents per hour,105
subject to various guarantees of working conditions and subsistence
wages in case of unemployment.106 Although twenty-four states availed
themselves of the program,107 it was not universally popular.
Contemporary economic reviews found that the program depressed the
wages of the United States’ own farm laborers,108 in addition to a
common view that the program was a type of wage-slavery.109
103. “Manual laborer,” from Spanish brazo, “arm.” KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE¾THE
BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 1 (1992).
104. E.g., id. at 19.
105. $4.46 per hour in 2017 dollars. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017)
(adjusting for inflation between August 1942 and August 2017).
106. Agreement for the Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers, Mex.-U.S., Aug. 4, 1942, 56
Stat. 1759, 1767–68 (“Wages and Employment” section of the international agreement establishing
the program).
107. E.g., CALAVITA, supra note 103, at 21.
108. U.C. Davis Dep’t of Agric. Econ., The Bracero Program, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, Vol. 9,
No. 2 (Apr. 2003), https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=10.
109. For example, Tom Lehrer sneered in a 1965 lyric, “And after all, even in Egypt, the
pharaohs / Had to import Hebrew braceros.” TOM LEHRER, George Murphy, on THAT WAS THE YEAR
THAT WAS (Reprise Records 1965). A decidedly less tongue-in-cheek view of the bracero program in
popular culture is Woody Guthrie’s 1948 song “Deportee (Plane Wreck at Los Gatos),” about migrant
Mexican farmworkers killed in an airplane crash while being deported to Mexico, and the
contemptuous treatment that they received in the United States previously. WOODY GUTHRIE,
Deportee (Plane Wreck at Los Gatos), on THE GREATEST SONGS OF WOODY GUTHRIE (Vanguard 1972)
(written as a poem by Woody Guthrie in 1948, put to music by Martin Hoffman, and performed in
this album by Cisco Houston).
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The bracero program has parallels to DACA and DAPA as an
invocation of executive power for multiple reasons. To begin, it stands
as “a series of programs initiated by administrative fiat, subsequently
endorsed by Congress, and kept alive by executive agreement whenever
foreign relations or domestic politics threatened their demise.”110 The
program was administered at various points by the Department of
Agriculture and its divisions, the Farm Security Administration, the
War Food Administration, the Department of State, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (“INS”), and the United States Employment
Service111¾all part of the Executive Branch. Thus, like DACA and
DAPA, the bracero program existed as an entity of administrative
agencies, and not by actual “executive order.” Furthermore, the periods
in which Congress wavered on its endorsement of the program are
similar to Congress’s qualms over the validity of the Obama
Administration’s actions, which stopped short of passing legislation to
terminate the policies.112
More relevant to our analysis, there is an implicit executive
invocation of foreign affairs power underlying the bracero program.
The program began through a 1942 agreement between the United
States and Mexico, negotiated between the United States Ambassador
to Mexico and the Mexican Minister for Foreign Relations.113 A
supplemental agreement detailing further conditions followed nearly
nine months later.114 Three days after the second agreement, Congress
formally endorsed the bracero program in a farm labor appropriation,
exempting contract agricultural workers from North, South, and Central
America from head taxes and admission charges, and loosening
documentation requirements.115 The bracero program endured until
Congress, by law, decided upon a final termination date of December
31, 1947.116 This was not the death knell for the program. Another
international agreement, effected by an exchange between the United
States Chargé d’Affaires ad interim and the Mexican Secretary for
Foreign Relations, allowed not only for the program’s continuation, but
also for new contract workers to arrive from Mexico.117 The agreement

110. CALAVITA, supra note 103, at 1–2.
111. Id. at 20–21.
112. See supra Part II.A.
113. Agreement for the Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers, supra note 106.
114. Agreement for the Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers Revising the Agreement of
Aug. 4, 1942, Mex.-U.S., Apr. 26, 1943, 57 Stat. 1152.
115. Act of Apr. 29, 1943, ch. 82, § 5(g); 57 Stat. 70, 73 (providing for the supply and distribution
of farm labor for 1943).
116. Act of Apr. 28, 1947, ch. 43, 61 Stat. 55, 56 (providing for the continuance and liquidation of
the farm labor supply program).
117. Agreement for the Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers Superceding the Agreement
Apr. 26, 1943 and May 10, 1947, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 21, 1948, 62 Stat. 3887–89.
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itself stated that its existence contemplated the prior administrative
regime’s sunsetting on December 31, 1947, in addition to considering
“the continued need for additional agricultural workers in certain
regions of the United States.”118 This agreement continued to govern
until the passage of Public Law 82-78 in 1951,119 which would be the
definitive word on the bracero program (with four extensions through
1959120) for the remainder of its existence.
The bracero program’s functioning through international
agreements belies a foreign affairs power consideration that the
executive branch invoked in the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S.
Truman Administrations¾both were Democratic presidents navigating
Democrat- and Republican-controlled Congresses. The agreements
between the United States and Mexico in 1942, 1943, and 1948 are just
that¾bilateral agreements between two countries, not treaties that
required the Senate’s advice and consent in accordance with the
Constitution. The executive may enter into an international agreement
on the United States’ behalf when acting pursuant to a preexisting
treaty, to preexisting legislation, or to inherent executive authority (for
example, when acting as the United States’ representative in foreign
affairs, when exercising the nation’s recognition powers, or when acting
as Commander-in-Chief).121 Likewise, as put by the Curtiss-Wright
Court, “the power to make such international agreements [that] do not
constitute treaties in the constitutional sense”122 is one of the main
areas of sovereign power where, by reason of that case’s holding, the
president has plenary authority to act on behalf of the nation.
Accordingly, diplomatic power¾here the power to enter into nontreaty international agreements¾was invoked to create the bracero
program, and indeed sustained it when Congress wavered in legislative
support for it. This is so even when considering the program’s sizeable
impact on immigration. Indeed, to administer the program more
effectively in the late 1940s, the INS developed a de facto legalization
program for undocumented braceros, even legalizing 55,000
undocumented farmworkers in Texas alone in the summer of 1947.123
All this occurred in addition to a significant foreign affairs interest that
the Department of State described immediately postwar: The United
States’ agreement with Mexico helped to stabilize Mexico against
118. Id. at 3887.
119. Act to amend the Agricultural Act of 1949, ch. 223, 65 Stat. 121.
120. CALAVITA, supra note 103, at 45.
121. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 723.2-2–732.2-2(C) (2006),
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/11FAM/11FAM0720.html.
122. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
123. CALAVITA, supra note 103, at 24. Professor Calavita expounds upon the Texas statistic,
stating that this legalization scheme “effectively circumvent[ed] the exclusion of Texas from the
formal program.” Id.
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communism in Latin America.124 On either rationale¾the authority to
enter into international agreements, or to advance policy interests
abroad¾the bracero program and the executive’s exercise of foreign
affairs power go hand-in-hand. This principle endures especially given
that the program had a major effect on immigration that colors the
United States’ relationship with Mexico today. In short, the bracero
program, as do the following two examples, lie at the nexus of
immigration policy and foreign affairs power.
B.

“FOREIGN-BORN ORPHANS”

A different type of executive power¾the commander-in-chief
power¾was at play in President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1956 policy
statement regarding foreign-born orphans adopted by U.S. citizens.
Arguably, many of his executive actions have considerable import, as
they were the first slew of executive immigration actions since the INA’s
passage over President Truman’s veto in 1952. Eisenhower issued a
policy statement on foreign-born orphans in 1956. He took issue with
the nationality quota system in the INA (as originally enacted) and the
Refugee Relief Act.125 The exhaustion of these quotas, which persisted in
immigration law since the 1920s,126 prevented many United States
citizens, who adopted foreign-born, non-U.S. citizen children, from
bringing those children to the United States.127 Indeed, the existing
scheme under the then-current INA made citizenship of a foreign-born
child contingent upon at least two years of permanent residency. Thus,
the inability to bring these children into the United States had the
added detriment of delaying the naturalization process of those who
were already adopted by United States citizens.128 Eisenhower was
especially sensitive to the status of many of these adoptive parents as
members of the armed forces who had adopted children during their
missions abroad.129
As a remedy to the foreign-born orphans situation, Eisenhower
consulted the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to see if there
was a solution “within the framework of existing law.”130 Evidently,
there was such a solution, and over 900 foreign-born adoptees were

124. See U.C. Davis Dep’t of Agric. Econ., supra note 108.
125. Statement by the President Concerning the Entry into the United States of Adopted
Foreign-Born Orphans, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 1033, 1033 (Oct. 26, 1956).
126. See generally Emergency Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (limiting the
immigration of aliens into the United States).
127. See Statement, supra note 125, at 1033.
128. See INA § 323(a)(3), ch. 447, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (articulating the two-year requirement).
129. See Statement, supra note 125, at 1033.
130. Id.
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able to enter the United States pursuant to the policy.131 Eisenhower
concluded by stating: “Provision for bringing these orphans into our
country, pending action by Congress to amend the law, will be put into
effect immediately.”132
The heart of the inquiry is whether Eisenhower invoked some type
of foreign affairs power in issuing the 1956 statement. Similar to DACA,
it was not a literal “executive order,” but rather an enunciation of
enforcement intent, and it pertained to families with non-citizen
members seeking residence in the United States. In explicit relation to
foreign affairs power, it is impossible to overlook that the Eisenhower
statement specifically addresses adoptive parents who were
servicemembers. This arose out of a particular moment in American
history. In consequence of the Korean War as well as the rebuilding of
Europe and Japan after World War II, many members of the armed
forces overseas adopted “foreign-born” children.133 Indeed, Congress at
this time specifically considered emergency legislation that would have
amended the Refugee Relief Act in order to allow for more “orphan
visas”¾an action that the Department of State at the time considered as
grounded in foreign affairs.134 It is worth remembering, however, that
the foreign-born orphans statement only refers to servicemembers in a
general sense, and does not refer to the servicemembers in Korea,
Japan, and Europe specifically. The circumstances described above are
probative of context only.
The president’s commander-in-chief power is a foreign affairs
power, and it illuminates the background of the 1956 foreign-born
orphan policy. This conclusion flows from the specific citation of
American servicemembers in the statement, as well as in the historical
context. Of course, commander-in-chief power cannot be construed to
afford the president the power to micromanage the lives of people who
happen to serve in the armed forces.135 However, the view of what this

131. See id.; see also Executive Grants of Temporary Immigration Relief, 1956–Present, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (2014),https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research
/executive_grants_of_temporary_immigration_relief_1956-present_final_0.pdf (indicating 923
orphans as beneficiaries of the Eisenhower policy).
132. Statement, supra note 125, at 1033–34.
133. See Eleana Kim, The Origins of Korean Adoption: Cold War Geopolitics and Intimate
Diplomacy 4 (U.S.-Kor. Inst. at Johns Hopkins Sch. Advanced Int’l Stud., Working Paper No. 09-09,
2009). Indeed, nearly all of the “inter-country adoptions” by American servicemembers in 1954 were
Japanese children. Id. at 21 n.16.
134. 35 DEP’T ST. BULL. 45, 75 (1956); accord Kim, supra note 133, at 10.
135. Cf. David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 484–85 (2008)
(discussing the narrowness of the Commander-in-Chief power); see also id. at 487 (“[Foreign affairs
authority] might be thought to subsume the commander in chief authority.”). David Luban
illustrates in his article On Commander in Chief Power that the power most recently reached a
zenith during the George W. Bush Administration, in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. See id. at 568–69. The President cannot, however, invoke his Commander-in-Chief power to
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commander-in-chief power entails has waxed and waned, both legally
and academically, over time. It seems to follow, then, that the president
might invoke his commander-in-chief power, even when not “making
war,” when soldiers are explicitly involved. The 1956 foreign-born
orphan policy specifically indicated servicemembers as the parties
affected by the policy, after over a decade of the United States being a
warring or occupying force in Europe and Asia. An invocation of
commander-in-chief power arises not only out of the parties affected,
but the situation that led to their adopting foreign-born orphans in the
first place.
C.

THE STUDENTS OF TIANANMEN SQUARE

The senior President Bush’s administration saw executive action
pertaining to Chinese nationals in the United States, a reaction to the
1989 pro-democracy protests in the People’s Republic of China.
Congress later enacted legislation in accordance with the executive
order. Beginning in April 1989, several thousand Chinese university
students marched on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, demanding a
governmental shift toward democracy in light of the recent death of
Chinese Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang.136 As the protests grew
and continued for almost two months, Beijing was placed under martial
law,137 whereby the Chinese armed forces violently suppressed the
protest in Tiananmen Square by June 5.138 The protests and the martial
law that followed left the country in disarray even after the protests’
suppression.139
The following year, President George H. W. Bush issued Executive
Order 12711¾entitled “Policy Implementation with Respect to
Nationals of the People’s Republic of China”¾in response to the
protests and consequent upheaval in Mainland China.140 The order
provided for a number of protections directed toward Chinese nationals
in the United States, including: (1) deferred deportation of any Chinese
nationals who were in the United States from June 5, 1989 (the date the
protests were forcibly suppressed) and April 11, 1990 (the date of the

affect the lives and businesses of civilians, as the Youngstown majority opinion iterated. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
136. E.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinese Students March for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 1989, at A3.
137. E.g., Beijing Is Placed Under Martial Law—Protestors Defy Order to Disperse; Zhao
Reportedly Has Resigned, SEATTLE TIMES, May 19, 1989, at A1; Martial Law Declared in Beijing
—Protesters Block Troops; TV Reporters Restricted, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, May 20, 1989, at A1.
138. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Turmoil in China; Foreboding Grasps Beijing; Army Units
Crisscross City; Foreigners Hurry to Leave, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1989, at A1.
139. See id.
140. Exec. Order No. 12711, 3 C.F.R. 13897 § 1 (1990).

VANLANDINGHAM -69.1.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2017]

EXECUTIVE POWERS AND IMMIGRATION

12/22/17 12:44 AM

377

order) until January 1, 1994;141 (2) waiver of various documentation
requirements required for residence and reentry to the United States;142
and (3) employment authorization through January 1, 1994.143 The
order also provided for “enhanced consideration . . . for individuals
from any country” articulating a fear of “forced abortion or coerced
sterilization” upon return to their home country based upon that
country’s policies144¾a probable nod to China’s then-current “one-child
policy.” 145 The terms of Executive Order 12711 were solidified through
legislation upon the passage of the Chinese Student Protection Act in
1992.146
While similarities between Executive Order 12711 and DACA can be
drawn, they are superficial. Both policies delay the removal of people
who are nonetheless formally removable. Furthermore, both policies
have time-based boundaries of applicability and contemplate
employment authorization.147 Nonetheless, the comparison is not truly
on-point. In 1992, the Democrat-controlled Congress ratified
Republican President Bush’s actions through the Chinese Student
Protection Act two years after the executive order. On the other hand,
the Republican-controlled Congress in 2015 and 2016 held hearings on
whether the Obama policies were constitutional, as a threshold
matter.148 In the House Judiciary Committee hearing, Congressman
Goodlatte disputed relying on the Executive Order 12711 as precedent,
stating that President Bush’s actions were authorized by the INA.149 On
the other hand, as Congressman Goodlatte stated, the Obama
Administration acted “[w]ithout any crisis in a foreign country to justify
[the President’s] actions, . . . granting deferred action without any
statutory authorization, . . . [and] clearly exceed[ing] his constitutional
authority.”150

141. Id.
142. Id. § 2.
143. Id. § 3(c).
144. Id. § 4 (cross-referencing the Attorney General’s then-new regulation, Refugee Status,
Withholding of Deportation, and Asylum; Burden of Proof, 55 Fed. Reg. 2,803 (Jan. 29, 1990) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 205.5(b)).
145. See generally, W.X. Zhu, The One Child Family Policy, 88 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD
463, 463 (2003) (describing the Chinese government’s hope that there will be a shift towards the
“small family culture”).
146. See Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969.
147. Compare Exec. Order No. 12711 § 3(c) (establishing employment authorization for the
applicable Chinese nationals), with DACA MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at 3 (allowing U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services to accept applications to determine eligibility for work
authorization).
148. See House Deferred Action Hearing, supra note 44; Senate Deferred Action Hearing, supra
note 48.
149. House Deferred Action Hearing, supra note 44, at 3.
150. Id.
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The congressman’s comment gets at the heart of President Bush’s
invocation of foreign affairs power in issuing Executive Order 12711.
Before considering this issue, it must be said that setting a bright line at
a “crisis in a foreign country” before taking executive action is
misplaced. Indeed, an action like the bracero program hardly meets the
definition of a “crisis in a foreign country” and occurred without
statutory authorization. Similarly, the foreign-born orphans policy did
not arise out of a “crisis” in the usual sense¾in fact, that statement and
the Obama-era deferred action policies both attempt to ward off family
disunity, a “crisis” albeit on a personal level, not an international one.
The point remains, however, that President Bush’s executive order was
in reaction to an international crisis, and nationals of that
country¾some eligible for deportation¾remained in the United States.
Surely, it would be inhumane to apply the U.S. laws governing
deportation so much by rote as to deport people to their native country
that had just called in its army to suppress a pro-democracy series of
protests. Thus, Executive Order 12711 invoked the executive’s foreign
affairs power¾generally, to promote the United States’ foreign affairs,
and particularly, to take a stance against what the federal government
viewed as the bloody stifling of democracy and free expression
abroad.151
D. LESSONS FROM THREE EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
These immigrant-inclusive executive actions, which all invoked the
president’s foreign affairs power to some degree, are noteworthy
precisely because of their uncontroversial nature. That these actions did
not cause sustained friction in Congress or the federal judiciary
indicates a view that these presidents were operating within their
proper sphere of power. Because (1) there is no clear statutory
through-line giving the president this power; (2) the actions involved
foreign nationals or the United States’ interaction with foreign nations;
and (3) the president has plenary power to conduct foreign affairs, it
follows that the actions described in Parts IV.A. through IV.C. were
reasonable exercises of the president’s foreign affairs power.
Therefore, another part of the rule that will be discussed in Part V
emerges: the president reasonably exercises foreign affairs power over
immigration when his actions can be called “individual presidential

151. Both the President and members of Congress denounced the actions of the Chinese
government as soon as they happened. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, The West Condemns the
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1989. Accord Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012)
(“Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed
a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state may be mired in civil
war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or
his family will be harmed upon return.”).
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foreign affairs power.” Individual presidential foreign affairs power
includes presidential power either expressly authorized by the
Constitution (for example, commander-in-chief power, pertaining to
the foreign-born orphans policy) or existing by virtue of sovereign
authority (for example, entering into non-treaty international
agreements, or promoting foreign affairs interests in time of
international crisis). There are doubtless other categories in the field of
“individual presidential foreign affairs,” however, those are best
determined based upon a case-by-case basis. Express statutory
delegation will be discussed below.152

V. SYNTHESIZING A THEORY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
ON EXECUTIVE IMMIGRATION ACTIONS
Part III of this Note concluded by stating that the president may
exercise his foreign affairs power pertaining to immigration actions, but
must do so in a manner that respects Congress’s Article I authority. Part
IV concluded by detailing what an appropriate exercise of this foreign
affairs power might look like in immigrant-inclusive actions, within the
parameters of “individual presidential foreign affairs.” Because, even
from the early days of the Republic,153 the Constitution requires all
governmental actors to have limits upon their power in order to
maintain the rule of law, a rule can be synthesized out of the foregoing
arguments: presidential foreign affairs authority, based on past
practice, supports the president’s power to offer limited forms of
immigration relief, at least in the absence of clear congressional
prohibition, if the president judges that denying such relief might have
foreign affairs consequences. This rule can be used to delineate the
limits on the executive’s otherwise plenary diplomatic power when the
executive acts alone on immigration.
This rule can be distilled into a framework that may be applied in
the case of DACA or future similar scenarios where a president
independently takes an action on immigration that provides relief or
otherwise acts to keep the immigrants in the nation’s borders.
Specifically, the president may act on immigration by himself (or
through an executive department) if the action: (1) does not interfere
with Congress’s legislative power over immigration, and (2) falls within
the realm of “individual presidential foreign affairs powers.”

152. See infra Part V.A.
153. In The Federalist, for example, Alexander Hamilton explained why treaty ratification
required the advice and consent of the Senate rather than being vested in the President alone. To
Hamilton, the President should have his treaty-making authority checked by the legislature, since
“[a]n ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price of
his treachery to his constituents” were the President alone able to conclude treaties. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 74, 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1863).
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Application of this conjunctive test is ultimately up to a court to
decide, based upon given facts. The following sections present one
possible way in which a court might apply this test.
A. THE ACTION MUST “NOT INTERFERE WITH CONGRESS’S
LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER IMMIGRATION”
Determining Congress’s legislative power over immigration
requires a close reading of the Naturalization Clause. The
Naturalization Clause grants Congress the power to create a uniform
rule of naturalization, a process to create more citizens and to govern
their behavior while in the United States.154 Moreover, it is a uniform
rule. It allows uniformity of negotiation and governance, so that
“foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of
their nationals in the United States [can] confer and
communicate . . . with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate
States.”155
Congress has enacted a number of immigration laws that fall
within its Article I power. Arizona v. United States provides some
guidance on determining the scope of presidential foreign affairs
authority over immigration. Arizona considered whether federal law
preempted the State of Arizona’s then-recently enacted statutory
scheme that gave state officials considerable power over undocumented
immigrants.156 In interpreting whether each provision of the Arizona
law was preempted, the Court expounded upon what Congress’s actual
authority over immigration entailed. Although this analysis was
originally provided to contrast state-versus-federal power over
undocumented immigrants, it is probative of the nature of Congress’s
power to legislate on immigration matters, generally speaking. In the
Court’s view, congressional power over immigration included: (1)
determining the entry requirements of immigrants, and allowing for
removal procedures157; (2) requiring immigrants to register solely with
the federal government158; (3) regulating the employment of
undocumented immigrants159; (4) regulating when an immigrant can be

154. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
155. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.
156. See id. at 2497–98.
157. See id. at 2499.
158. “As it did in Hines, the Court now concludes that, with respect to the subject of alien
registration, Congress intended to preclude states from ‘complement[ing] the federal law, or
enforc[ing] additional or auxiliary regulations.’” Id. at 2503 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 66–67 (1941), insertions in original).
159. “Congress enacted IRCA as a comprehensive framework for ‘combating the employment of
illegal aliens.’” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504 (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,
535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)).
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detained during the removal process;160 and (5) allowing state officials
to verify immigration status during an authorized, lawful detention by a
state or local officer.161
The list indicated above is not exhaustive. Nonetheless, where a
president attempts to act in a manner that falls within one or more of
these areas of congressional action, this prong of the immigrationforeign affairs power rule will not be satisfied. Moreover, any action
would also have to respect the basic constitutional rights with which
Congress has been entrusted,162 such as due process of the law, equal
protection of the laws,163 and First Amendment rights. As such, this
constitutional compliance step may properly be called the “zero step” of
this analysis.
Congressional acquiescence goes hand-in-hand with the discussion
on congressional authority, to recall the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Dames & Moore.164 While many members of Congress voiced their
disagreement, the voices of individual representatives or senators do
not equal congressional action. As DACA reached its fifth anniversary
unrevoked and without meaningful abrogation or ratification by
Congress, this evidence of congressional acquiescence must support the
view that the policy did not interfere with Congress’s legislative power
over immigration.
Not every action the president may take on immigration acts to
keep immigrants in the country’s borders. What to make of situations
like section 212(f) of the INA, wherein Congress has specifically
delegated the president expansive power to exclude? After all, that
section reads, in relevant part:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or any class
of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States, he may by proclamation, suspend the entry of all
aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or
impose on the entry of aliens any restriction he may deem to be
appropriate. 165

160. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505. The Court went on to state that this regulation also prohibited
state officers from “mak[ing] warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in
specific limited circumstances.” Id. at 2507.
161. Id. at 2509.
162. Although these rights have been viewed as applying against all governmental actors, the text
of the Constitution specifically applies them to legislative matters. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I
(“Congress shall make no law” abridging freedoms of religion, the press, speech, petition, or
assembly) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
163. Although the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring equal protection, is written regarding the
states, the doctrine of reverse incorporation applied it to the federal government as well. See Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954).
164. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
165. INA § 212(f) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)(2012)).
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Section 212(f) pertains to immigrant-exclusive actions, or executive
actions that act as a bar or restriction on entry. As such, this is outside
of this Note’s scope. However, while this power might sound
expansive—a wholesale legislative concession to the president to act on
immigration as he sees proper—in practice, it was not so prior to 2017.
From 1981 to 2016, aliens excluded under section 212(f) had to belong
to discrete, well-defined classes of people who performed acts that
might threaten national security, such as “engaging in malicious
cyber-enabled activities” or engaging in a coup d’état.166 Furthermore,
removing immigrants or barring them from entry implicates due
process considerations167 that actions to permit immigrants to continue
residing in the United States do not.
B.

THE ACTION MUST “FALL WITHIN THE REALM OF ‘INDIVIDUAL
PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS’”

For an executive action to satisfy the second prong of this rule, it
must fall within the realm of “individual presidential foreign affairs
powers.” As explained throughout Part IV, these “individual
presidential foreign affairs powers” include: (1) power granted expressly
through the Constitution, such as commander-in-chief power (the
“foreign-born orphans” statement) or recognition power (Zivotofsky v.
Kerry168); (2) power invoked pursuant to an international agreement
not rising to the level of a treaty (the bracero program); and (3) power
invoked in response to larger international concerns (United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.), especially when nationals of the affected
foreign country are in the United States (Executive Order 12711).
These examples raise an important issue: If the president may
navigate only within these and similar areas a court might designate as
“individual presidential foreign affairs powers,” is the president’s
foreign affairs power truly plenary? This Note posits that it still is.
Boundaries to the power are necessary lest a president argue that
everything he does relating to immigrants is “diplomatic” in nature,
thereby causing gridlock with Congress and cloaking himself in quasidictatorial power. The power is still plenary within these boundaries.
This is the overarching theme of having a federal government exercising

166. KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44743, EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO EXCLUDE
ALIENS: IN BRIEF 6–10 (2017).
167. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process
of law . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
168. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court held that, constitutionally, the power to recognize foreign
nations resided solely in the President. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015). This prevented the American
parents of a child born in Jerusalem from listing the child’s place of birth as “Jerusalem, Israel” (versus
“Jerusalem”) on the child’s United States passport, contrary to a congressional act. Id. at 2096.
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limited delegated powers pursuant to a written constitution—that
freedom requires powers to be exercised within limits.
C.

APPLICATION TO DACA AND DAPA

Upon application of this test to DACA and DAPA, these Obama-era
immigration policies pass the first prong of the rule set forth above. The
deferred action policies do not trammel upon Congress’s Article I
legislative power. The policies do not attempt to regulate the actions of
immigrants, documented or not, during their time in the United States.
It is possible to argue that the policies interfere with removal
procedures regarding the immigrants who were “inadmissible at the
time of entry,” as the Arizona Court considered.169 However, the merits
of this argument are in question. The policies do not create new swaths
of immigrants who are deportable, or create de facto amnesty for
undocumented immigrants already in the United States. This is
apparent on the face of the policies¾the government’s guarantee
through DACA is nonbinding,170 and the DAPA policy specifically states
that it guarantees “no substantive right, immigration status or pathway
to citizenship.”171 The nonbinding nature of the policies reinforces their
exercise as enforcement discretion, rather than a substantive change in
the law that would require congressional input. Choosing how to
enforce the nation’s immigration laws is peculiar to the executive
branch as a separation-of-powers principle, and because it would be
impossible “to coherently identify a set of congressional priorities for
immigration enforcement” by performing a textual analysis on the
“300-page immigration code.”172 Therefore, it seems as though the
deferred action policies pass the first prong of the rule.
The second prong of the rule is where the analysis becomes
troublesome. In light of the judicial issues that surrounded DAPA, this
analysis is limited to DACA. The Obama DHS did not establish DACA
pursuant to an international agreement. The essential inquiry is
whether DACA serves some foreign affairs end. It would likewise be
possible to argue that DACA could prevent undocumented immigrants
from being discharged into potentially hostile environments in their
home countries, such as Executive Order 12711 under President Bush’s
Administration. President Obama expounded upon the policy
underlying DACA at the press conference where the policy was
announced. He stated: “Imagine you’ve done everything right your
entire life . . . only to suddenly face the threat of deportation to a

169.
170.
171.
172.

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
See DACA MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at 3.
DAPA MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at 5.
Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 58, at 110.
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country that you know nothing about, with a language that you may not
even speak.”173 Although DACA’s beneficiaries hail from many different
countries¾not all of which might be rent by war or other domestic
turmoil¾President Obama’s statement hearkens to an underlying
presumption that they might. Furthermore, the military service
provision of DACA,174 as well as President Obama’s specific
contemplation that DACA would help “a young person who is serving in
our military, protecting us and our freedom,”175 call upon the
president’s constitutional authority over the military, in penumbral
fashion. Furthermore, although not an example of individual
presidential foreign affairs power, larger concerns of international
amity were at stake with DACA. In this respect, the decline in tourism to
the United States after President Trump’s Executive Orders 13769 and
13780 indicate the pitfalls of being perceived as a nation unfriendly to
foreigners.176
Thus, it appears that DACA, at least, might pass the rule
enunciated in this Note. However, reasonable minds can differ. At the
very least, though, this framework affords an alternative to the Obamaera stalemate between Congress and the executive branch over DACA.
This stalemate ensued in the controversies that DACA and DAPA
provoked regarding the APA and the Take Care Clause. This proposed
new framework specifically avoids implicating those legal or
constitutional provisions.
CONCLUSION
On March 9, 2015, forty-seven Republican U.S. Senators drafted an
open letter to the leaders of Iran regarding the then-current nuclear
negotiations between Iran and the United States.177 Naturally, this letter
encroached upon the executive branch’s authority to transact
international relations, as it did not conform to any legal, theoretical, or
historical bases for exercising foreign affairs power. Since the president
173. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration.
174. See DACA MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at 1.
175. Obama, supra note 173.
176. See, e.g., Christopher Muther, You Could Call US Tourism a Victim of Trump’s Travel Ban,
BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/travel/2017/02/14/
trump-ban-causes-tourism-drop-and-industry-fears-lasting-effect/yzMAVzeLvqywP8gEekoFsL/
story.html.
177. See Letter from Tom Cotton et al., U.S. Senators, to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of
Iran (Mar. 9, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150311023113/http://www.cotton.senate.gov/
sites/default/files/150309%20Cotton%20Open%20Letter%20to%20Iranian%20Leaders.pdf;
see
also Press Release, Sen. Tom Cotton, Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators Send Open Letter to the
Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.cotton.senate.gov; Peter Baker,
G.O.P. Senators’ Letter to Iran About Nuclear Deal Angers White House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2015,
at A1.
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is the only constitutional actor with the authority to interact with
foreign dignitaries,178 the drafting and publication of the letter was
arguably an act without constitutional authority.
The purpose of discussing the Iran letter is not to set up a tu
quoque argument (“If the Republicans can thwart the Democrats’
constitutional duties, why can’t the Democrats do the same?”). Rather,
it reveals how the branches of government encroach on each other’s
authority¾often in shows of political posturing¾all the time. This
intrusion can occur even in area like national security and foreign
affairs, where the president’s power is usually regarded with extreme
deference. This interplay is an inherent risk of having a government
composed of three coequal branches, all governing a diverse and often
rancorous body politic.
Largely, this Note rebuts the uncomplicated view of executive
power over immigration law that many commentators put forth since
the DHS announced DACA in 2012 up to President Trump’s litany of
executive orders on immigration in early 2017. The public’s views on
these two presidents’ actions often wafted like a feather in the political
breeze. Some condemn DACA as executive overreach while esteeming
President Trump’s “travel ban” judicially unreviewable—and vice versa.
A new framework is necessary as long as the federal government
continues to stalemate on the issue of immigration, and the American
citizenry continues to demand change in one direction and then the
other.
Admittedly, the argument posed in this Note is novel. Immigration
is an oddity in the United States legal system, and the constitutional
rights of immigrants¾especially undocumented ones¾remain
convoluted.179 Furthermore, the presidency has transformed by leaps
and bounds since the days of the Framers. President Washington
considered the presidency an office of the nation’s “Chief Magistrate,”180
an administrative responsibility. Compare this with the election of
2016, where rhetoric around the presidency seemed to reflect a
178. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers.”).
179. See generally Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 59; see also I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984) (stating that removal proceedings do not require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt; Fourth Amendment-based exclusionary rules are inapplicable; Ex Post Facto
Clause does not apply in removal cases; the Eighth Amendment does not require bail to be granted in
removal cases); see also Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because a deportation
hearing is a civil proceeding involving non-citizens, aliens involved in such proceedings do not enjoy
the full panoply of constitutional rights that American citizens would enjoy in a criminal
proceeding.”). But see Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (requiring removal proceedings to
conform to Fifth Amendment due process); Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza:
Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Deportation Proceedings,
44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477, 526 (2013).
180. President George Washington, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1793).
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perception that the president is directly and personally responsible for
creating jobs, passing laws, and ensuring the nation’s health and
greatness.181 As the people of the United States look to the president,
and not a deadlocked Congress to set immigration law and policy, a
clearer framework for the president’s power is necessary.


This is the riddle of immigration law in the United States: that a
nation that passed the Chinese Exclusion Act into law in 1882 also
produced Emma Lazarus’s poem “The New Colossus” scarcely more
than a year later. All of the preceding analysis aside, it is worth
remembering that immigration law and policy in the United States is
not really about passports, visas, statutes, constitutional provisions, and
sovereign power. In short, immigration law is not really about
immigration “law.” Immigration law, as wave after wave of
discrimination since the nineteenth century has illustrated, is about the
nexus of race, class, and religion with the prevailing policy of dominant
social classes. Until that becomes the background for conceptualizing
immigration law, this field will remain condemned to an eternal
tug-o’-war in the courts, in Congress, in the White House, and on the
streets.

181. See, e.g., Carmen Fishwick & Guardian readers, Why Did People Vote for Donald Trump?
Voters Explain, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/
nov/09/why-did-people-vote-for-donald-trump-us-voters-explain.

